

CAN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY BE DECOLONIZED? A DEBATE

2024/01

AUTHORS

Hans Asenbaum
University of Canberra

Nicole Curato
University of Canberra

Bonny Ibhawoh
McMaster University

Genevieve Fuji Johnson
Simon Fraser University

Justin McCaul
Australian National University

Ricardo F. Mendonça
Federal University of Minas Gerais

EDITORS

Hans Asenbaum
University of Canberra

Friedel Marquardt
University of Canberra



UNIVERSITY OF
CANBERRA

CENTRE FOR DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

ABOUT THE SERIES

The Centre for Deliberative Democracy & Global Governance working paper series makes preliminary findings of research on deliberative democracy publicly available in advance of publication in journals and books. The series aims to present new research that makes original, high-quality contributions to the theory and practice of deliberative democracy, informed by recent literature in the field.

For further information see:

<http://www.governanceinstitute.edu.au/centres/deliberative-democracy-and-global-governance/working-paper-series>

Views expressed in working papers are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the Centre's members.

CAN DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY BE DECOLONIZED? A DEBATE

AUTHORS

Hans Asenbaum
University of Canberra

Bonny Ibhawoh
McMaster University

Justin McCaul
Australian National University

Nicole Curato
University of Canberra

Genevieve Fuji Johnson
Simon Fraser University

Ricardo F. Mendonça
Federal University of Minas Gerais

EDITORS

Hans Asenbaum
University of Canberra

Friedel Marquardt
University of Canberra

Working Paper Series No. 2024/01

Centre for Deliberative Democracy & Global Governance
Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis
University of Canberra
ACT 2601
DELDEM.CANBERRA.EDU.AU
GOVERNANCEINSTITUTE.EDU.AU

INTRODUCTION

The project of deliberative democracy is driven by goals of inclusion and equality. Deliberative democrats seek to create environments ‘where norms of respect, inclusiveness, mutual justification and open-mindedness are fostered’ (Curato et al., 2021, p. 2). These are noble pursuits. However, the scholarship and practice of deliberative democracy still fails to fully acknowledge and account for various injustices, such as racial injustice and the deeply entrenched legacies of colonialism. While not novel to this issue, there is increased discussion in many spaces about decolonization, along with measures being taken to rectify harmful influences of colonization (Rodríguez, 2018).

Other fields within political theory (Getachew & Mantena, 2021), such as international relations (Jones, 2006), have developed sophisticated and nuanced debates about what decolonization means within their realms. Deliberative democracy is an exception: it joins these debates late. The reason might be that deliberative democrats perceive themselves as immune to decolonizing critiques. The field of deliberative democracy is deeply rooted in critical theory that staunchly opposes all forms of domination and leads towards emancipation. While we cherish these goals, we also need to reflect on their particularity and rootedness in Western enlightenment thinking. This intellectual ignorance universalises Eurocentrism and shrouds racial and economic privilege within the global economy and global hierarchies.

At the same time, one reason for the ongoing fascination with, and the success of, deliberative democracy is its own humility and openness to learning. In many ways, deliberative democrats practice what they preach by being open to opinion transformation (Ercan et al., 2022). This openness and adaptability are best demonstrated by the lasting impact feminist debates in deliberative democracy have had on the field (Mansbridge, 1983; Young, 2001). The feminist challenge that criticised the deliberative focus on verbal, rational exchanges was welcomed by deliberative democrats who augmented deliberative theory and practice, accordingly.

We see this political moment in time, in which anti-racist and decolonizing agendas gain new momentum—in part advanced by the global Black Lives Matter movement and Indigenous movements around the world—as a welcome challenge and an opportunity to deepen and re-think deliberative democracy’s normative commitment.

In April and May of 2022, the Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance at the University of Canberra hosted a seminar series to debate decolonizing deliberative democracy. A range of speakers contributed to this debate, whom we are pleased to have as contributors to this special working paper symposium. This symposium is an opportunity to further consider where deliberative democracy falls short and to encourage debates around what a decolonized deliberative democracy looks like.

Contributions to this symposium come from diverse cultural backgrounds with authors from South America, Africa, Asia, Europe, and Australia contributing perspectives from political theory, sociology, communication studies, and law. It needs to be noted that despite this diversity, all contributors are located in Global North academic institutions. In many ways, this highlights the problem and the urgency of decolonization.

Contributors were asked to respond to the question: Can deliberative democracy be decolonized? This question was intentionally formulated pointedly and provocatively and is rightly criticised in some of the following contributions. Our intention was to spark a debate, and sometimes being pushed to take a side can contribute to diverse and

fruitful exchanges. To map this debate, we structure contributions from the negation of the possibility of decolonizing deliberative democracy to those opening up a potential for decolonization.

First, Genevieve Fuji Johnson argues that deliberative democracy's deep entrenchment in colonial logics prevents its decolonization. She raises three points, namely, that deliberative democracy is unable to return stolen land, does not challenge racism against Indigenous peoples, and does not foster ongoing relationships of care. Justin McCaul builds on Johnson's argument. In engaging with Indigenous rights in Australia from a legal perspective, he contends that deliberative democracy cannot be decolonized because decolonization cannot start from a Western Enlightenment project and, instead, needs to be driven by Indigenous peoples. Nicole Curato strikes a more hopeful tone. While she remains undecided about whether decolonization efforts can succeed, she makes an argument for a global deliberative democracy that connects diverse ideas and experiences. A global deliberative democracy needs to dismantle colonial concepts and thinking, which need to be placed in museums like the statues dismantled by Black Lives Matter activists. Bonny Ibhawoh opens perspectives towards decolonizing deliberative democracy by introducing four approaches: (1) questioning Western universalism and epistemic exclusion, (2) rethinking deliberative concepts, (3) taking concrete and practical steps, and (4) including non-Western ideas and experiences of communitarian governance. Finally, Ricardo Mendonça and Hans Asenbaum argue for situating a decolonizing ethos at the heart of the deliberative project. Rather than ticking a check box, decolonizing needs to be understood as an ongoing process. To constructively rebuild deliberative democracy, we need to theorise inductively with Indigenous peoples, learn from non-Western scholarship, and re-focus on emancipation.

As editors of this symposium, we are pleased by the diversity and depth of these contributions. This is only the beginning of a debate, which, we hope, will contribute to the development and ongoing transformation of deliberative theory and practice.

If you are interested in viewing the seminars that inspired this symposium, they can be found on the [Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance's YouTube channel](#).

Why we (probably) cannot decolonize deliberative democracy

Genevieve Fuji Johnson

Many of us settlers in Indigenous territories, and many of us beneficiaries of colonialism—myself included, as a *Yonsei* (fourth generation Japanese-Canadian)—want to decolonize. But do we know what this means? Without a clear understanding of the implications of what decolonization would entail, how can we be sure that we are not further entrenching settler coloniality?

In this short contribution, I hope to provoke deeper reflection on the magnitude of tasks associated with decolonizing settler societies and states. I focus on deliberative democracy—celebrated for embodying liberal virtues of inclusion, equality, reason sharing, and agreement—and offer several thoughts on why I believe that it cannot, at the moment, be decolonized. I speak primarily to settlers, that is, those of us who came to Indigenous territories invited and wilfully, and who have played and continue to play roles in upholding colonialism. My argument that deliberative democracy probably cannot be decolonized comprises three points: Deliberative democracy does not serve in the return of Indigenous territories; it does not challenge racism against Indigenous peoples; and it does not facilitate the building of meaningful relationships of care, responsibility, and accountability.

By suspending the urge that many practitioners and theorists of deliberative democracy may have to create a more inclusively thoughtful approach to governance that is ‘decolonized,’ we might instead prepare ourselves to engage in the difficult work that decolonization requires. Decolonizing deliberative democracy requires more than including Indigenous peoples in its decision-making processes. In my view, it requires settlers revoking our claims to ‘innocence,’ of facing our complicity in colonialism, and of opening ourselves to governance futures *that centre Indigenous peoples, facilitate their resurgence, and are articulated by them*. Without this prior work, attempts to decolonize deliberative democracy—and other democratic innovations of the settler imagination—risk metaphorisation that not only impedes decolonization but actually deepens coloniality (see Tuck & Yang, 2012).

For Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson and Yellowknives Dene scholar Glen Coulthard, decolonization is fundamentally connected to groundedness in land and water, and in relations among inhabitants—past, present, and future (see Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2016). Decolonization can only be achieved through a place-based ethic, which is rooted in territory. Territory is the basis of a sustainable interconnectedness of all beings. As Coulthard (2014, p. 13) writes, decolonization ‘is best understood as a struggle primarily inspired by and oriented around *the question of land*—a struggle not only for land in the material sense, but also deeply *informed* by what the land *as a system of reciprocal relations and obligations* can teach us about living our lives in relation to one another and the natural world in nondominating and nonexploitative terms’ (italics in original). In Simpson’s words, decolonizing ‘means centering grounded normativity in my life and in the life of my community, while critically analyzing and critiquing the ways in which I’m replicating white supremacy, antiblackness, heteropatriarchy, and capitalism’ (Simpson, 2016, p. 22). My read of these works is that territory gives rise to an ethic that is not only non-dominating but fundamentally that of anti-domination. Given this broad conception of land, water, inhabitants, ethics, and governance, decolonization is necessarily about environmental, social, and political ways of collective organisation that are anti-domination, anti-oppression, and anti-hierarchy.

Decolonization requires radical change. We cannot be partially anti-domination and anti-oppression, nor can we pick and choose which hierarchy to transform and the extent to which we transform that hierarchy. Given these intertwined territorial and non-territorial imperatives, decolonization must be deeply troubling for all who benefit from colonialism. And, in light of the necessary rootedness of decolonizing projects in Indigenous territory and sovereignty, I argue that deliberative democracy cannot be decolonized for three reasons.

First, deliberative democracy cannot be decolonized because it does not serve the return of territory to Indigenous people. Hypothetically, participants in deliberative democratic forums might agree that land must be returned to Indigenous people. But how likely are they to agree to municipalities leasing land from Indigenous nations? How likely are they to agree to paying property taxes to Indigenous nations? How likely are they to agree to paying tolls to Indigenous nations to traverse rural areas? In the context of Canada, where Indigenous women were about six times more likely to be murdered than non-Indigenous women (Department of Justice, 2017), where Indigenous adults—representing four percent of the adult population—account for about 28 percent of admissions to correctional services (Malakieh, 2018), and where an Indigenous grandfather and his 12-year-old grandchild were handcuffed by the police because a bank teller thought their Status Indian ID cards were fraudulent (Sterritt, 2020)—where, in other words, systemic anti-Indigenous racism is widespread—it is unlikely that deliberants would agree to any of the above. They might, nonetheless, agree to granting Indigenous nations discrete parcels of land. This is in fact the *status quo* in the reserve system long entrenched in Canada's Indian Act, which, in many ways, is the legislative embodiment of colonialism in Canada (Joseph, 2018).

Territory must be returned, and Indigenous sovereignty must be acknowledged, as a necessary step in decolonization. This return and acknowledgement are not up for deliberation, which, by nature, is open-ended and based on the exchange of reason among a sample of the population. Indeed, putting the question of whether to return territory to deliberative democracy would be an act of colonialism because of the priority placed on the preferences of the supermajority. In the context of existing settler democracies, the supermajority comprises settlers. In deliberative democratic forums, this supermajority is likely to skew toward more privileged settlers (see, for example, Afsahi, 2020; Mendelberg et al., 2014). In any case, the point is that the decision is reached according to the principles established by settlers and according to the preferences of settlers who have benefited and who continue to benefit from colonialism.

Second, as alluded to above, deliberative democracy cannot be decolonized because it does not challenge racism against Indigenous peoples. Although deliberative democracy has become more inclusive, as it has moved away from the stronghold of reasonability and toward other forms of expression, including storytelling (Young, 2001), these moves are not synonymous with anti-racism. Similarly, including Indigenous peoples in deliberative forums does not end racism in this context.

Racism against Indigenous people, while brutal, usually hides in plain settler sight. Racism is rarely intentional, often taking place at the hands of well-intending people. Racism is typically systemic and structural. Since deliberative democratic forums take place within this context, they are not immune to oppressive forces. White settlers—for example, who have never experienced racism but who think they know what racism is ('it is incidental, not systemic'), claim that they do not see race ('I'm colour blind'), and believe, therefore, that they are not racist ('how can I be racist if I don't see colour?')—come into these spaces. Even if facilitators make 'community agreements' about respecting other deliberative participants, can we really expect them to check their whiteness at the door?

For some racialised and minoritised individuals, genuine discussions about racialisation and racism are neither possible nor desirable with White people. I personally avoid such discussions with White people and would never participate in a deliberative forum focusing on topics related to racialisation and racism. In the existing context, deliberative democracy is too likely to invite discursive violence that is obfuscated by appeals of innocence, expressions of defensiveness, and principles of procedural equality and fairness. These spaces are not impermeable to systems of oppression including racism, sexism, transphobia, ableism, classism, and so on; they are thus difficult spaces for minoritised individuals who regularly experience these forms of oppression.

Third, deliberative democracy cannot be decolonized because it does not facilitate the building of meaningful relationships of care, responsibility, and accountability. Deliberative democracy often comes down to an event or series of events. Typically, participants in deliberative events are strangers to each other. They come together for moments in time, as individuals, without their kids or without their family members. They deliberate, and then they disband. The agenda for deliberative events is usually packed, and the experience tends to feel rushed and pressurised. These events are often exhausting and draining. My observation of Citizen Initiative Review processes, for example, is that there typically is insufficient time for participants to get to know each other, to have unstructured conversations, to make food and eat together, to open up and share stories, to relax and kick back, to become vulnerable and have deeper exchanges, and to build meaningful relationships (Bussu et al., 2022; Johnson et al., 2019; Lukyanova et al., 2019).

Yet meaningful relationships are central to endeavours to decolonize (see Starblanket & Stark, 2018). As Gina Starblanket (Cree and Saulteaux and a member of the Star Blanket Cree Nation in Treaty 4 territory) and Heidi Kiiwetinepinesik Stark (Ojibwe from Turtle Mountain) write, there is ‘an important difference between understanding our place in the world as situated within relations of interdependence with all of creation and living in a way that carries out our responsibilities within these relationships’ (Starblanket & Stark, 2018, p. 177). It is hard to see deliberative events giving rise to relationships of interdependence, responsibility, and care. Decolonization must involve fundamental transformations of oppressive systems and structures so that these relationships can take root and begin to shape our ways of collective governance.

So, let’s return to the question of whether deliberative democracy can be decolonized. In its centring of a settler construct, is this very question an act of coloniality? Are discussions about decolonizing deliberative democracy, in fact, be preventing us from starting the much harder work of decolonizing ourselves, of letting go of our claims to innocence, of acknowledging and addressing our complicity in colonialism and anti-Indigenous racism, and of turning away from a future in which the ontology, epistemology, and ethics of the beneficiaries of colonialism remain prioritised? If we really want to contribute to decolonization, why do we, in these conversations, prioritise deliberative democracy over Indigenous protocols for collective decision-making among peoples and Indigenous visions for collective organisation? If we really want to decolonize, we need instead to centre Indigenous peoples as they articulate place-based and relational conceptions of collective organisation. Let’s listen to them and follow their lead toward a future that is likely very different from what we settlers imagine.

Deliberative democracy must first engage with settler colonialism

Justin McCaul

Settler colonialism and its effects on deliberative engagement between Indigenous peoples and government is, I believe, under-theorised and therefore largely absent in the literature of deliberative democracy. Before the field of deliberative democracy asks, *can it be decolonized*, the field must first engage with the work of Indigenous scholars on settler colonialism and political struggle. Deliberative democrats interested in the potential of the field to decolonize must begin by building collaborations with Indigenous academics, institutions, and programs that are challenging established norms in political theory, institutions, and governance. These new alliances are more likely to yield insights into the usefulness of deliberative democracy and the struggles of colonized, Indigenous peoples.

My discussion of deliberative democracy and decolonization is informed by both my being an Indigenous person and my work with Indigenous people within Australia. Beginning in the 1960s, Indigenous people in Australia have called for the creation of institutions and processes to better enable Indigenous people to have a much greater say in the law and policymaking. Despite some success and creation of deliberative and participatory innovative democratic institutions (Behrendt, 2005), the participation of Indigenous people in decision-making in Australia is more often denied, ignored, or partial at best. Colonization in a settler colonial state such as Australia is an ongoing project of domination over Indigenous people—a structure, not an event as Patrick Wolfe (1999, 2006) argues, which means that the state is always seeking to assimilate, if not eliminate, Indigenous peoples' distinctiveness. Decolonization is, consequently, also an ongoing project.

Much of the political disagreement between Indigenous peoples and the Australian state concerns the unresolved matters of dispossession, Indigenous sovereignty, and the right to self-government. Law—as a mode of Western rationality explains Robertson—enabled European nations to legally dispossess Indigenous people from the lands they occupied by reasoning that Indigenous people held no legal relationship (in European thought) with their lands (Robertson, 2005, p. ix). When British settlers arrived in Australia in the late 18th century, they employed the legal doctrine of *terra nullius*, a Latin term meaning 'land without people,' to acquire sovereignty despite the land clearly being occupied at the time by many hundreds of Indigenous peoples and nations. Australia continues to refuse any acknowledgement of any form of Indigenous sovereignty as co-existing with that of the sovereignty of the Australian state. The situation is one of 'constitutional legitimacy crisis' involving disagreement between Indigenous people and the Australian state concerning foundational constitutional questions (Appleby et al., 2023).

As Banerjee (2021) explains, Western Enlightenment reasoning and philosophies of history provided the intellectual justification of colonialism. Banerjee is right when he argues that such use of reason allows colonizers to simultaneously create forms of domination and *justify this through the use of reason itself*. As he explains, liberal ideas of democracy are deeply embedded in the idea of Empire, whose mission involved political subjugation of those it sought to civilise without a critical reflexivity of the impact of European colonialism.

The problems created by colonization and, by extension, Enlightenment and Western Eurocentric thought in Australian democracy has been the focus of a wide body of scholarship by critical legal and political scholars calling into question the legitimacy of so-called liberal democratic states with a history of settler colonialism, including Indigenous scholars

such as Watson (2004) and Moreton-Robinson (2015), as well as non-Indigenous scholars such as Ivison (2020). However, there has been too little engagement within the field of deliberative democracy with this scholarship nor the literature of law and Indigenous political theory to understand the challenge that colonized, Indigenous peoples face within settler states.

In 2020, the World Bank estimated Indigenous people constitute some 6 percent of the global population (approximately 476 million people) in over 90 countries. Arguably the most politically active Indigenous groups are those residing within notable liberal democracies—the so-called ‘CANZUS’ states of Canada, Australia, Aotearoa New Zealand, and the US (Gover, 2015). Yet, despite the extensive academic interest in deliberative democracy over the past 40 years, the field says little in relation to Indigenous peoples. This situation is somewhat surprising, firstly, because the challenges Indigenous peoples face in settler colonial democratic societies would seem to align with the so-called emancipatory potential of deliberative democracy. The emancipatory and transformative potential of deliberative democracy resides in the securing of ‘equal participation of otherwise excluded social groups in public deliberation that can transform pre-existing assumptions held by the broader society about the legitimacy of the demands of socially excluded groups’ (Bashir, 2012, p. 136).

A few scholars have attempted to grapple with the challenge settler colonialism poses to the normative claims of deliberative democracy. For example, Valadez (2001; 2010) discusses how the conditions of settler colonialism, in which the dominant system of settler law is imposed over Indigenous law, makes deliberative democracy—understood as reciprocal giving of reasons that are reasonable from the perspective of other deliberators—difficult to satisfy. Additionally, Bashir (2012, p. 140) argues that the ‘politics of reconciliation’ must be established before deliberation is possible in settler colonial states such as Australia and Canada with Indigenous peoples with historical injustice claims against the state. Bashir rightly argues that historically excluded social groups are sceptical of any conception of democratic inclusion that requires them to set aside experiences of oppression and exclusion. Reconciliation is therefore necessary to create conditions for deliberation or establishing the space in which deliberation can occur.

The question of whether deliberative democracy can be decolonized is problematic as, I believe, thinking of decolonization in absolutist terms is unhelpful. The reality is that Indigenous people, globally, continue to resist and struggle to regain access to their land and protect it from the forces of economic neoliberalism in which states and corporations seek to profit from Indigenous natural resources. Additionally, any move towards ‘decolonizing deliberative democracy’ would require Indigenous peoples to lead and formulate new theoretical and empirical work from the perspective and lived experience of colonized, Indigenous people living under conditions of settler colonialism.

In this sense, Johnson’s argument that deliberative democracy needs to engage in a ‘grounded approach’ to empirical research with oppressed groups, such as Indigenous peoples, will strengthen both accountability and ensuring research can be directed *towards* advancing struggles for justice and not simply studying about such struggles. The voices of Indigenous people must not be the focus of study but the driver of new research, as Johnson (2022) states, to build relationships with Indigenous communities to learn from them, to follow their lead, and to be accountable to them. If decolonizing deliberative democracy simply entails research that is enacted upon Indigenous people, it will only serve to minimise colonizer guilt or what Tuck and Yang (2012) call ‘settler moves to innocence.’

The field needs more empirical studies of the place where Indigenous peoples deliberate as they develop strategies for navigating liberal, representative democracy. Like the work of Hendriks, Ercan, and Boswell (2020) on democratic

repair by ordinary citizens in community settings, the field needs to undertake more empirical work in Indigenous spaces. In keeping with the concept of deliberative systems, the field needs to look beyond formal institutions and seek out spaces in which Indigenous people deliberate, self-organise, and self-govern (Parkinson & Mansbridge, 2012).

In my own research, I examine how the recognition of 'native title' (Indigenous people's pre-colonial land rights) within Australia's settler legal system has created a unique deliberative space and Indigenous constituency of 'rights holder' that can contest issues of colonization, sovereignty, and self-government. This is often done through local and place-based deliberative processes relating to environmental management and public policy (Moodie & Maddison, 2023). These community based deliberative spaces may offer what Banerjee (2021) describes as insights into democratisation processes 'from below' that are more participatory than representative forms of democracy because social relations are based on Indigenous notions of reciprocity and exchange, rather than competition.

However, Indigenous people in Australia are also engaged in democratic innovation at the national level with them calling for an 'Indigenous Voice to Parliament' to be enshrined in the Australian constitution. A national referendum will decide if this proposal succeeds. Regardless whether this referendum becomes successful or not, it represents a new deliberative institution within Australia's democracy driven by Indigenous people. It has been described as an Indigenous democratic innovation produced by a 'structured, deliberative decision-making process that engaged Indigenous participants in a dialogue' (Davis, 2018, p. 27).

In conclusion, I do not believe deliberative democracy can be decolonized if this goal is understood as some idealistic endpoint. That is to say, decolonizing deliberative democracy cannot produce the wholesale return of Indigenous lands to Indigenous people, but it can contribute to a better understanding of Indigenous people's modes of deliberation and innovative efforts to forge more inclusive decision-making processes. As Indigenous people's ongoing struggles make clear, decolonization is a continuing process of challenging the norms and presumed authority of the state. To do this, deliberative democracy needs different examples of the lived experiences of Indigenous people living under settler colonialism.

Nonetheless, I believe the field has much to learn by engaging more with the political struggles of Indigenous people to better understand deliberative democracy under conditions of settler colonialism. A more helpful question may therefore be: Should deliberative democracy engage with Indigenous scholars to understand the limitations of deliberative democratic theory in relation to Indigenous people and settler colonialism? Settler colonialism and its effects on deliberative engagement between Indigenous peoples and government is, I believe, under-theorised and therefore largely absent in the literature of deliberative democracy. As stated earlier, any move to decolonize deliberative democracy must begin with the field engaging with Indigenous scholars who are challenging established norms in political theory, institutions, and governance. Building new alliances are more likely to yield insights into the usefulness of deliberative democracy and the struggles of colonized, Indigenous peoples and move the field into largely under-theorised understanding of Indigenous peoples' perspectives on discursive practices. And as Johnson argues, this work must be done so from a place of inclusivity, accountability, and solidarity with Indigenous people (Johnson 2022, 62).

Must deliberative democracy's statues fall?

Nicole Curato

Last year, my dear friend Sofie Marien drove me to Ekeren, a village in Antwerp, to visit the site where King Leopold II's statue once stood. The statue was taken down after Black Lives Matter protesters in Belgium defaced it and set it on fire (see James-Chakraborty, 2022). This may seem odd. What is the point of driving seven kilometres from Central Antwerp to a residential village to *not* see a statue? But with strangeness comes insight. When I looked at the concrete where the statue once stood, I did not see emptiness but possibility. Statues of brutal colonialists have taken up too much space over the decades. Taking them down signals that there is now space to build something new.

My thinking about 'decolonizing deliberative democracy' was partly prompted by this experience. I wonder whether there are statues of deliberative democracy—symbolic statues, at least—that must fall so we can build something new. What legacies of colonial oppression hinder the theory and practice of deliberative democracy to become a truly emancipatory global project? What statues must fall?

There is an easy way to 'decolonize' deliberative democracy.¹ To paraphrase Robbie Shilliam (2021), we can simply look for the most exotic forms of deliberation around the world, appreciate their uniqueness, and declare that indeed, deliberative democracy is a universal experience, not one that is limited to 'advanced Western democracies.' But when we do this, we only shift our focus to studying the margins, while leaving deliberative democracy's Western, European centre intact.

This is the work that I have been doing in the past decade (see Curato, 2019; Curato, 2021). My intellectual project was to examine how deliberative democracy can take root in contexts of precarity, such as post-disaster and post-conflict societies in the Global South, particularly my home country, the Philippines, and in so doing, contribute to the development of deliberative theory. Today, I realise that this approach is a form of intellectual cowardice. What I have done is to reposition the gaze of deliberative scholarship to practices in other parts of the world. What I did not interrogate is why these deliberative practices have been in the peripheries of deliberative scholarship in the first place. Why not? Because I did not want trouble.

Some political theorists, however, were ready to make trouble. Some argue that the Frankfurt School is to blame. The Frankfurt School is known for its critique of domination, from which various deliberative scholars draw inspiration. However, as Edward Said (1994, p. 278) argues, the Frankfurt School is 'stunningly silent on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in empire.' This silence, he contends, is not a mere oversight, but a motivated silence (see Baum, 2015 for counterargument). If we examine critical historiographies of European modernity, it becomes apparent that colonialism and racism were the preconditions for Enlightenment ideals to emerge. Put another way, racism and colonialism were foundational to European Enlightenment thought on which deliberative democracy

¹ I place decolonize in quotation marks because I am not confident that I am using the term properly. I recognise that decolonization is not a metaphor (Tuck & Yang, 2004) and there are long debates in the field about the proper use of the term.

is based. To ‘decolonize’ deliberative democracy, we should treat the so-called canons on which deliberative theory is based, in the same way fallen statues have been treated in some societies. Statues were relocated to museums instead of reinstalling them back in public squares, so the statues can be contextualised and placed in conversation with other artifacts that demonstrate the legacies of colonial rule.

Take the case of reason, a foundational concept in deliberative democracy. Habermas describes the emergence of European modernity as development toward rationality (Habermas, 1985). Reason prevails when sacred knowledge is replaced by knowledge based on the rational adjudication of validity claims. For Amy Allen (2016), there is a teleological narrative embedded in this claim. It portrays Europe as an agent of progress. It sets the European path of development—of modernity—as a normative standard for progress while non-European cultures were considered pre-modern and, therefore, irrational. The United States Declaration of Independence, which claimed that all men are created equal, had an implicit caveat. Non-Europeans were not created equal, because they were considered primitive—they were non-peoples, therefore, not bearers of reason.

Why should we talk about this? We need to talk about this because the Eurocentric foundations of deliberative democracy are implicated in advancing a worldview responsible for the conceptual erasure of societies that have existed before colonialism. It is a worldview that sees Europe as the main referent of progress or modernity or a benchmark for where the world is headed.

This may have happened ages ago, but the legacy remains today. Where do we, as scholars or advocates of deliberative democracy, get the audacity to say that deliberative democracy is a superior normative ideal? Where do we get the confidence to say that we should promote deliberative democracy around the world? Why are some of us so bold in claiming that the future of democracy is deliberative democracy? Is it because there is a deliberative wave happening in OECD countries, therefore ‘lower income’ countries will catch up next? Isn’t the boldness of our vision as deliberative democrats a legacy of the Eurocentric teleological account of progress—a continuation of the story that we are modern, and they are primitive?

It is still an open question to me as to whether we can decolonize deliberative democracy. One possibility worth considering is exposing the connections of dominant deliberative practices today to the legacies of colonialism, slavery, and dispossession.

Here, in Australia, we have held several citizens’ juries in the Old Parliament House. The world’s first Australian citizens’ Parliament, for example, took place in that historic building. Across the Old Parliament House is the world’s longest occupation: the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. It has stood there since the 1970s to protest Indigenous land rights, sovereignty, and self-determination. This is what I mean when I say we need to expose the connection of deliberative democratic innovations to the legacies of colonialism, slavery, and dispossession. We have the privilege of experimenting with democratic innovations, of pushing the boundaries of democratic politics because we are doing it on stolen land.

Many of us, me included, try to reconcile this historical fact by proposing to recruit Indigenous participants in citizens’ juries as a marker of inclusion. But this tiptoes around the issue that we are innovating democracy on stolen land. We have the privilege of experimenting with democratic innovations, of pushing the boundaries of democratic politics because we are doing it on stolen land. We need to render these relationships of oppression visible in deliberative democracy. We need to recognise that our much-valued principles of freedom, reason, and societal progress were underwritten

by an economic system built on the enslavement of non-European labour and extermination of Indigenous people. Taking inspiration from Charles Mills (2019), we cannot treat deliberative democracy as a ‘neutral baseline’ as if nothing happened before as the legacies of what happened before continues to shape our societies today.

We need to reimagine a global deliberative democracy that connects various practices and traditions of deliberative democracy from around the world. The key word here is connected: connected practices and traditions of deliberative democracy. A global deliberative democracy does not just say that deliberative democracy is a pluralistic field of study that recognises deliberative cultures in places like Barbados, Puerto Rico, and India. A global deliberative theory argues that the deliberative culture that emerged in the European public sphere was made possible by the extractivist relations of Europe to its colonies. This, from my reading so far, has been erased in the dominant literature on deliberative democracy. A global deliberative theory examines how conditions of possibility for deliberation in some societies could actually be based on the oppression or dispossession of people from other societies. The challenge is to lay bare these relationships of power and imagine a global order where these relations cease to exist.

So, what can be done? Here are preliminary thoughts.

In terms of academic work, our first task is to de-universalise the so-called canons of deliberative democracy, and to stop using Europe as a reference point for successful deliberation for most of the world. We need to situate the European experience of deliberative democracy within its own colonial histories—to provincialise Europe, as some scholars put it (see Chakrabarty, 2008).

Second, we need to put our time where our mouth is. I say time, and not money, because academics usually have no money. We need to devote time to meaningfully engage the work of thinkers from the Majority World to forge meaningful connections between the different traditions of deliberative democracy. Imagine what happens when imperial centres listen to—not talk at—colonial margins.

Finally, one might wonder, isn’t this just another progressive agenda that has gone on overdrive? Some argue that the decolonization agenda distracts us from thinking about the real issues as we experience the crisis of communication. Well, to me, the crisis of communication is a crisis of decolonization. For so long, we have been stuck in certain ways of knowing and doing, such that many people—many epistemologies—cannot breathe.

We need to create space for a connected and global deliberative democracy. And for this space to flourish, perhaps some statues must fall.

Decolonizing deliberative democracy: Four possible approaches

Bonny Ibhawoh

A discussion on decolonizing deliberative democracy must begin with a foundational question: Why is it necessary to decolonize *dominant paradigms* of deliberative democracy? The reference to the ‘dominant paradigm’ here is instructive. It draws attention to the premise of my intervention in the debate. What needs decolonizing is not deliberative democracy as a normative decision-making principle. The notion of consensus decision-making and the principle that deliberation should be central to decision-making are evident to varying degrees across many societies and cultures (OECD, 2020). Consensus-based decision-making—the roots of deliberative democracy—dates to pre-historical times. What requires decolonizing is the dominant West-centric paradigms and hegemonic pedagogical frameworks of deliberative democracy that lay claim to universality and immutability.

Western political theorists who first articulated the notion of deliberative democracy—from Joseph Bessette (1994) to John Rawls (1999)—framed deliberative democracy as an association whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members. The value of such an association is that it ‘treats democracy itself as a fundamental political ideal and not simply as a derivative ideal that can be explained in terms of the values of fairness or equality of respect’ (Cohen, 2002, p. 19). Deliberation aims at finding rationally motivated consensus in decision-making. Among the critical elements are respect for a pluralism of values, recognition of the deliberative procedure as the source of legitimacy, and acknowledgement of the deliberative capacity of each group member.

Ironically, the scholarship on deliberative democracy does not quite reflect these principles of *pluralism*, *legitimacy*, and *inclusive respect for deliberative capacity* that are foundational to theories of deliberative democracy. If anything, the scholarship on deliberative democracy remains dominated by West-centric frameworks, paradigms, and cases. This trend is evident from a simple journal database search of the countries and regions referenced in articles on deliberative democracy. It is also apparent on crowdsourced data platforms such as Participedia, where over 60 percent of the case studies tagged ‘deliberative democracy’ as having focused on Western countries or models developed in the West. As project director of Participedia, I have sought to address this lopsidedness by focusing more on documenting deliberative processes in the Global South.

However, debates about deliberative democracy are also happening elsewhere, in different contexts. For example, as a platform for documenting democratic innovation, Participedia strives to bring in broad participatory approaches to the study of deliberative democracy that account for silences of colonial pedagogies, democratic exclusions, and the hegemonies of intellectual and praxis discourse (Participedia, 2023). Participedia researchers recognise that for many communities, the goals of empowerment, inclusion, self-development, and self-determination can only be realised within a decolonized framework of democratic innovation. This aspiration is reflected in Participedia’s Mission Statement, which states that although committed to democratic ideals, Participedia does not advance any ideological or programmatic agenda: ‘We believe there are many ways to advance democracy and that they will differ by place, history, culture, and context-based challenges. We recognize existing inequalities in the collection, theorization, and mobilization of knowledge about non-Western forms of democratic innovations. Participedia is committed to working to address this imbalance’ (Participedia, 2023).

What does a decolonized notion of deliberative democracy look like? I offer four approaches for decolonizing deliberative democracy.

The first approach questions the implicit and explicit assumptions about the universality and normative objectivity of Western liberal democratic theories, models, and practices. This requires paying more attention to democratic exclusions and the epistemic blind spots of liberal democracy. It also requires paying attention to the silences, omissions, and erasures of liberal democratic discourses. In some ways, this is what deliberative democracy is already doing by presenting an inclusive alternative to liberal democracy. However, decolonization demands a fundamental rethinking of what constitutes deliberation and the varied forms it can take.

The second approach rethinks notions such as democratic innovation and democratic deliberation, recognising that what constitutes innovation is relative and that deliberation can take diverse forms.

The third approach affirms decolonization as a substantive project—not simply a buzzword or a metaphor (Turk & Wayne, 2012). Decolonization is a tangible agenda that includes (but is not limited to) resistance to colonial hegemonies, restitution for indigenous epistemic repression and material dispossessions, and the affirmation of indigenous life.

Finally, decolonization means recognising and legitimising non-Western epistemologies on communitarian deliberative decision-making and representative governance. We have concrete examples of how this can be done. In Bolivia, longstanding practices of communitarian democracy based on Indigenous customs and traditions have been accorded constitutional recognition and even guide state policies. The inclusion of direct, participatory, and communitarian elements into the democratic system has improved representation for Indigenous peoples. Some indigenous communities have established new governance structures to assert self-determination through negotiations in a complex political field.

Decolonizing dominant West-centric paradigms of deliberative democracy begins with recognising Indigenous and other non-Western-inspired forms of discursive civic inclusion and deliberative participation in decision-making. Discursive decolonization requires fundamentally rethinking democratic concepts and reimagining what democracy can look like in various political, social, and cultural contexts. It requires expanding and, sometimes, deconstructing paradigmatic liberal democratic frameworks and ancillary concepts, such as democratic innovation and deliberative democracy.

A decolonized approach is essential to addressing current challenges with electoral democracy, which is increasingly strained in both the Global North and South. In developed countries, disaffected citizens are too easily mobilised by authoritarian populists and nationalists, and electoral majorities leave exclusions, inequalities, and injustices unaddressed. In developing countries, although significant strides towards responsive and accountable government are being made, human rights are often poorly institutionalised, corruption is endemic, and basic capacities for the collective provision of welfare and security are absent or constrained.

Current global crises complicate the assault on democracy—from climate change to refugee crisis, from armed conflicts to toxic forms of digital communication. These pose threats to people and political systems that are not matched by the scope, powers, and legitimacy of conventional liberal democratic norms and institutions. These political ruptures and socioeconomic disruptions reflect governance deficits that threaten democracy where it exists, stall progress where democracy is weak, and undermine collective capacities where issues exceed the capabilities of existing jurisdictions.

How do we respond to these varied threats to democracy? How do we address new challenges to democracy when old Enlightenment precepts and liberal democratic theories no longer suffice? We seek fresh ideas and rediscover long-overlooked indigenous methods. To meet the needs of increasingly cosmopolitan societies where the historically marginalised actively demand inclusion, we need to re-imagine governance systems. The United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has noted that as societies become ever more multi-ethnic, multi-religious, and multi-cultural, we need greater investments in inclusivity and cohesion to harness the benefits of diversity for all humanity, rather than perceiving it as a threat. Part of this investment includes re-imagining what democracy can look like within and beyond the state.

Decolonization places new demands on liberal democracy by addressing its representational blind spots with its reliance on elections and political parties as primary communication channels between representatives and citizens (Rice, 2016, p. 225). Conceptual and discursive decolonization can strengthen democracy in an era when democratic principles are under assault. Conceptual decolonization can help us better understand Indigenous deliberative practices and draw on them to enhance civic inclusion and participatory democracy. At the very least, a decolonized approach to liberal, electoral democracy will allow more space for indigeneity, representation, and self-determination.

The Report of Canada's National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls that outlines a notion of decolonization scholars of democracy will find helpful. The Report states: 'A decolonizing approach aims to *resist* and *undo* the forces of colonialism and to re-establish Indigenous Nationhood. It is rooted in Indigenous values, philosophies, and knowledge systems. It is a way of doing things differently that challenges the colonial influence we live under by making space for marginalized Indigenous perspectives' (MMIWG, 2019). Decolonizing approaches involve recognising inherent rights through the principle that Indigenous peoples have the inalienable right to govern themselves in relation to matters that are internal to their communities; integral to their unique cultures, identities, traditions, languages, and institutions; and with respect to their special relationship to their resources (MMIWG, 2019, p. 57).

In Nunavut, the Inuit—in seeking to incorporate their values, beliefs, and worldviews into a Canadian system of government—have opted to pursue self-determination through a public government system rather than through an Inuit-specific self-government arrangement. The guiding principle of the Government of Nunavut is *Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit* (or 'that which is long known by the Inuit'). 'IQ,' as it is commonly described, has become the key mechanism for incorporating Inuit cultural values into a Canadian system of government. Studies have shown that the emergence of these new mechanisms for Indigenous and popular participation has the potential to strengthen democracy by enhancing or stretching liberal democratic conceptions and expectations (Rice, 2016, p. 220).

Decolonizing deliberative democracy foregrounds the recognition and reaffirmation of Indigenous cultures and values within the rules and institutions that govern society. It entails re-imagining the nation-state, infusing the state with Indigenous principles, and creating new forms of citizenship. Decolonizing dominant West-centric democratic concepts through new participatory and communitarian elements can improve the representation of Indigenous communities and other marginalised groups in democratic processes. More broadly, decolonization can help address the limitations of democratic theory and the contemporary crisis of democracy.

Situating a decolonial ethos at the core of deliberative democracy

Ricardo F. Mendonça and Hans Asenbaum

Colonialism is at the very heart of modernity. This is the main argument developed by decolonial theories, which have emphasised how the Western democratic ideals of rationality, publicity, and inclusion not only neglect but depend on colonial exploitation (De Aragão Ballestrin, 2013; Banerjee, 2021; Mignolo, 2009; Quijano, 2007). Modern Western democracies thrive and blossom in contexts marked by colonial violence that allow the extraction and accumulation of resources necessary to sustain these same democracies. Resources of several kinds and forms of knowledge extracted from Latin America, Africa, and Asia are at the very heart of the economic development of modern, liberal, and democratic Europe.

Theories of deliberative democracy are grounded in this modern logic and, hence, struggle to challenge deep colonial inequalities. The project of deliberative democracy is not an active agent of colonialism. It has, however, benefitted from colonial systems and has engaged in negligence and ignorance. Deliberative democracy is, thus, guilty of un-reflected complicity. The research field of deliberative democracy has never managed to properly face how modern forms of rationality have been used to promote and justify exclusion, exploitation, and violence. To be clear, we are not arguing that rationality is intrinsically violent. Nor are we saying that rationality is a Western creation (Ani, 2014). Framing pre-modern and non-Western societies as irrational is a product of modernity. Many deliberative democrats, however, build on modern thinking without questioning it, and this has implications for the practice of deliberative democracy. The commodification and de-contextualisation of deliberative innovations is one dimension of this issue (Johnson, 2015; Hammond, 2021; Lee, 2014). Another dimension of the problem emerges in the internal relations within the academic field, as Westernised academics can only interpret related concepts through Western lenses and fail to recognise the originality and plurality of non-Western contributions.

So, can deliberative democracy be decolonized? If decolonization is understood as an end state or fixed condition to be reached, then the answer is no. However, the answer can change to ‘maybe’ if we think of decolonizing as an ongoing process. Decolonization requires permanent critique, questioning, and rethinking. We suggest understanding decolonization as an ethos, rather than a checkbox. Instead of a temporary acknowledgement of decolonial theories, a decolonizing ethos needs to be situated as the core of deliberative democracy and continuously drive the deliberative project. In this way, decolonization constitutes an ongoing process of fundamental reformulation of deliberative democratic theory and the re-invention of deliberative democratic practice.

If we imagine decolonization in processual terms, the a priori negation of the possibility of decolonizing deliberative democracy makes no sense (Banerjee, 2021). Decolonial theory is not supposed to simply deconstruct existing theories but can play a positive role if thought of as a critical approach capable of making other theories—such as deliberative democracy—aware of their limits, problems, and complicities. In this way, we are convinced that it is worth trying to decolonize deliberative democracy. An ethos of decolonization contributes to the emancipatory drive of original critical theories of deliberative democracy (Hammond, 2019). After all, critical theories of deliberative democracy ‘are most confidently directed against particular repressive or exploitative social relations based on class, gender, race, spatial location, dominant kinds of rationality, and so forth’ (Dryzek, 1990, p. 30). Deliberative democracy’s concern with mutual respect, empathy, and diversity favours the displacing dialogues necessary for a decolonizing project.

Upon an extensive critique and deconstruction of deliberative democracy, we propose three concrete moves to continuously rebuild a self-aware deliberative approach with a decolonizing ethos at its centre.

First, we suggest starting from the bottom-up by engendering a more inclusive process of theory building which includes indigenous communities and social movements. Engaging with an ecology of knowledges can push deliberative democracy in new and more inclusive directions. Ailton Krenak (2019, p. 12), for instance, claims that an ecology of knowledges integrates the ordinary collective experiences and practices of Indigenous communities to challenge the idea of a homogeneous humanity. Indigenous and decolonial methods, with their openness to nonhuman participants, introduce a flat, non-discriminatory ontology (Rosiek, Snyder, & Pratt, 2020). This flat ontology emphasising the equality of participants, the participatory approach to theorising which enhances the agency of participants, and the dialogical quality of this type of inquiry deeply resonates with deliberative democratic values (Johnson, 2022).

Second, we propose a more open and democratic engagement with the Global South or Majority World scholarship. The Global South, and its diaspora in the North, should not be seen as a source of cases investigated with anthropological curiosity. It must not be framed as an inventory of exotic illustrations. Global South scholarship should be met through open dialogue and democratic listening. We claim that proper dialogue could reshape the relationships within the field of deliberative democracy, allowing not only broader scrutiny around concepts and research findings, but also a pluralisation of the theoretical instruments employed. Such broader exchange can lead to a more nuanced approach to democracy, which is capable of grasping context-sensitive issues and avoiding attempts to universalise and reify democracy.

Third, deliberative democracy needs to re-focus on emancipation. Deliberative democracy must emphasise its critical roots to face existing injustices and forms of exploitation (Hammond, 2019). It is not enough to design ideal forums for dialogue and neglect the grave power asymmetries in the broader polity. Inequalities related to gender, race, sexuality, and class must be brought to the centre of debates and understood as a starting point for deliberative theorising.

By starting with inductive theorising, including Majority World conceptions of deliberative democracy, and finally connecting these insights and perspectives to the critical roots of deliberative democracy, we can situate a decolonial ethos at the core of the deliberative democratic project. In providing these concrete moves, we aim at going beyond metaphoric thinking. The decolonizing effort is a practical and concrete project that requires challenging extant forms of oppression and asymmetries (Yang & Wayne, 2012). Theory shapes how we see the world, and the current theories of deliberative democracy are still linked to colonial ways of thinking. Therefore, to decolonize deliberative practice, we need to rethink theories of deliberative democracy.

REFERENCES

- Afsahi, A. (2020). Gender difference in willingness and capacity for deliberation. *Social Politics*, 28(4), 1046–1072. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxaa003>
- Allen, A. (2016). *The end of Progress: Decolonizing the normative foundations of critical theory*. <https://columbia.degruyter.com/view/title/526843>
- Ani, E. I. (2013). On traditional African consensual rationality. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 22(3), 342–365. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12013>
- Appleby, G., Levy, R., & Whalan, H. (2023). Voice versus rights: The First Nations voice and the Australian constitutional legitimacy crisis. *Social Science Research Network*. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4339744>
- Banerjee, S. B. (2021). Decolonizing deliberative democracy: Perspectives from below. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 181(2), 283–299. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-021-04971-5>
- Bashir, B. (2011). Reconciling historical injustices: Deliberative democracy and the politics of reconciliation. *Res Publica*, 18(2), 127–143. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9163-1>
- Baum, B. J. (2015). Decolonizing critical theory. *Constellations*, 22(3), 420–434. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12169>
- Behrendt, L. (2005, November 24). *The abolition of ATSIC: implications for democracy*. <https://apo.org.au/node/2807>
- Bessette, J. M. (1994). *The mild voice of reason: Deliberative democracy and American national government*. University of Chicago Press.
- Bussu, S., Adrian B., Rikki D., and Graham S. (2022). Introduction: Embedding Participatory Governance. *Critical Policy Studies*, 16(2), 133–145. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2022.2053179>
- Chakrabarty, D. (2008). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton University Press.
- Cohen, J. (2002). Deliberation and democratic legitimacy. In *Routledge eBooks* (pp. 352–370). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203986820-28>
- Coulthard, G. (2014). *Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Curato, N. (2019). Democracy in a time of misery. In *Oxford University Press eBooks*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842484.001.0001>
- Curato, N. (2021). The Philippines. In *Routledge eBooks* (pp. 120–135). <https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003102441-8>

REFERENCES

- Curato, N., Farrell, D. M., Geissel, B., Grönlund, K., Mockler, P., Pilet, J. -B., Renwick, A., Rose, J., Setälä, M. & Suiter, J. (2021). *Deliberative mini-publics: Core Design features*. Bristol University Press.
- Davis, M. (2018). The long road to uluru: Walking together: Truth before justice. *Griffith Review*, 60, 13. <https://beta.informit.org/doi/10.3316/informit.585254385255524>
- De Aragão Ballestrin, L. M. (2013). América Latina e o giro decolonial. *Revista Brasileira De Ciência Política*, 11, 89–117. <https://doi.org/10.1590/s0103-33522013000200004>
- Department of Justice Canada. (2017). *Just facts: Missing and murdered indigenous women and girls*.
- Dryzek, J. (1990). *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy, and Political Science*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ercan, S., Asenbaum, H., Curato, N., & Mendonça, R. F. (2022). Researching deliberative democracy: Methods and approaches. In S. Ercan, H. Asenbaum, N. Curato, & R. F. Mendonça (Eds.), *Research methods in deliberative democracy*. Oxford University Press.
- Getachew, A., & Mantena, K. (2021). Anticolonialism and the decolonization of political theory. *Critical Times*, 4(3), 359–388. <https://doi.org/10.1215/26410478-9355193>
- Gover, K. (2015). Settler–State Political Theory, ‘CANZUS’ and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. *European Journal of International Law*, 26(2), 345–373. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chv019>
- Habermas, J. (1985). *The theory of communicative action: Volume 2: Lifeworld and system: A critique of functionalist reason* (Vol. 2). Beacon press.
- Hammond, M. (2018). Deliberative democracy as a critical theory. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 22(7), 787–808. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1438333>
- Hammond, M. (2020). Democratic innovations after the post-democratic turn: between activation and empowerment. *Critical Policy Studies*, 15(2), 174–191. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19460171.2020.1733629>
- Hendriks, C. M., Ercan, S. A., & Boswell, J. (2020). Mending democracy. In *Oxford University Press eBooks*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198843054.001.0001>
- Iverson, D. (2020). *Can liberal states accommodate indigenous peoples?* Polity Press.
- James-Chakraborty, K. (2022). Black Lives Matter: An architectural historian’s view from Europe. *Architectural Histories*, 10(1), 1–25.
- Johnson, G. (2015). *The democratic illusion: Deliberative democracy in Canadian public policy*. University of Toronto Press.

REFERENCES

- Johnson, G. (2022). Grounded normative theory. In S. Ercan, H. Asenbaum, N. Curato, & R. F. Mendonça (Eds.), *Research Methods in Deliberative Democracy* (pp. 52–65). Oxford University Press.
- Johnson, G. M., Morrell, M. E., & Black, L. W. (2019). Emotions and deliberation in the Citizens' Initiative review. *Social Science Quarterly*, 100(6), 2168–2187. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12707>
- Jones, B. G. (2006). Decolonizing international relations. In *Rowman & Littlefield eBooks*. <http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA81716170>
- Joseph, R. P. C. (2018). *21 Things you May Not Know about the Indian Act*. CBC. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/indigenous/21-things-you-may-not-know-about-the-indian-act-1.3533613>
- Krenak, A. (2019). *Ideias para adiar o fim do mundo [Ideas for Postponing the End of the World]*. Companhia das Letras.
- Lee, C. W. (2014). *Do-It-Yourself democracy*. <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199987269.001.0001>
- Lukyanova, E., Tolochin, I., Johnson, G. F., Knobloch, K. (2019). Varieties and Effects of Emotional Content in Public Deliberation: A Comparative Analysis of Advocate Arguments at a Citizens' Initiative. *Journal of Language and Politics* 18(3). 441–462. <https://doi.org/10.1075/jlp.14013.luk>
- Malakieh, J. (2018). *Adult and youth correctional statistics*. Statistics Canada.
- Mansbridge, J. (1983). *Beyond adversary democracy*. University of Chicago Press.
- Mendelberg, T., Karpowitz, C. F., & Oliphant, J. O. (2014). Gender inequality in deliberation: Unpacking the black box of interaction. *Perspectives on Politics*, 12(1), 18–44. <https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592713003691>
- Mignolo, M. (2009). Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26(7–8), 159–181. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276409349275>.
- Mills, C. W. (2019). The racial contract. *Cornell University Press eBooks*. <https://doi.org/10.7591/9780801471353>
- MMIWG. (2019). Reclaiming power and place: *The final report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls*. Privy Council Office, Ottawa.
- Moodie, N. & Maddison, S. (Eds.). (2023). *Public policy and indigenous futures*. Springer.
- Moreton-Robinson, A. (2015). *The white possessive*. <https://doi.org/10.5749/minnesota/9780816692149.001.0001>
- OECD. (2020). *Innovative citizen participation and new democratic institutions: Catching the deliberative wave*. OECD Publishing.

REFERENCES

- Parkinson, J., & Mansbridge, J. (2012). Deliberative systems: Deliberative democracy at the large scale. In *Cambridge University Press eBooks*. <http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9781139178914>
- Participedia. (2023). Mission. <https://participedia.net/about>
- Quijano, A. (2007). Coloniality and Modernity/Rationality. *Cultural Studies*, 21(2-3), 168-178, DOI: 10.1080/09502380601164353
- Rawls, J. (1999). *The law of peoples*. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/1343947.pdf>
- Rice, R. (2017). How to decolonize democracy: Indigenous governance innovation in Bolivia and Nunavut, Canada. *Bolivian Studies*, 220–242. <https://doi.org/10.5195/bsj.2016.169>
- Robertson, L. G. (2005). *Conquest by law: How the discovery of America dispossessed indigenous peoples of their lands*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rodríguez, C. (2018). *Decolonizing academia: Poverty, oppression and pain*. Fernwood Publishing.
- Rosiek, J. L., Snyder, J., & Pratt, S. (2020). The New Materialisms and Indigenous Theories of Non-Human Agency: Making the Case for Respectful Anti-Colonial Engagement. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 26(3–4), 331–346. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800419830135>
- Said, E. (1994). *Culture and imperialism*. Vintage Books.
- Shilliam, R. (2021). *Decolonizing politics: An introduction*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Simpson, L. B. (2016). Indigenous Resurgence and Co-Resistance. *Critical Ethnic Studies* 2(2), 19-34.
- Starblanket, G. and Stark, H.K. (2018). Towards a Relational Paradigm: Four Points for Consideration: Knowledge, Gender, Land, and Modernity. *Resurgence and Reconciliation: Indigenous-Setter Relations and Earth Teachings*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 186-242.
- Sterritt, A. (2020). Indigenous grandfather and 12-year-old handcuffed in front of Vancouver bank after trying to open an account. <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/indigenous-girl-grandfather-handcuffed-bank-1.5419519#:~:text=A%2012%2Dyear%2Dold%20girl,righ%20case%20may%20be%20filed>. Accessed 24 June 2023.
- Tuck, E., & Yang, K. W. (2012). Decolonization is not a metaphor. *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education and Society*, 1(1), 1–40.
- Valadez, J. M. (2001). *Deliberative Democracy, Political Legitimacy, and Self Determination in Multicultural Societies*. Westview Press.

REFERENCES

- Valadez, J. M. (2010). Deliberation, cultural difference, and indigenous self-governance. *The Good Society*, 19(2), 60–65. <https://doi.org/10.5325/goodsociety.19.2.0060>
- Watson, V. (2004). Liberalism and advanced liberalism in Australian indigenous affairs. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/030437540402900506>
- Wolfe, P. (1999). *Settler colonialism*. A&C Black.
- Wolfe, P. (2006). Settler colonialism and the elimination of the native. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 8(4), 387–409.
- Young, I. M. (2001). Activist challenges to deliberative democracy. *Political Theory*, 29(5), 670–690. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591701029005004>



UNIVERSITY OF
CANBERRA



INSTITUTE FOR
GOVERNANCE
& POLICY ANALYSIS

Institute's Office Building 23, Level B University of Canberra ACT 2601

Research and PhD Enquiries Telephone +61 2 6201 2755 **Professional Development and Education Enquiries** Telephone +61 2 6201 2977